Method of comparing private data without revealing the data

ABSTRACT

Disclosed in this specification is a method and program storage device for comparing two sets of private data without revealing those private data. If the comparison deems the two data sets sufficiently similar, helper data may be provided to permit reconstruction of one of the private data sets without transmission of that private data set.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application claims priority to and the benefit of co-pending U.S. provisional patent application Ser. No. 61/505,562, filed Jul. 8, 2011, which application is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.

STATEMENT REGARDING FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARCH OR DEVELOPMENT

This invention was made with government support under grant no. 80209-01 17 awarded by a PSC-CUNY Collaborative Research Award and a National Science Foundation Division of Undergraduate Education (NSF DUE) Award under grant no. 0837535. The government has certain rights in the invention.

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

This invention relates, in one embodiment, to a method of comparing a first and second private data without either original private data being revealed.

BACKGROUND

Biometric approach for authentication is appealing because of its convenience and possibility to offer security with non-repudiation. However, additional hardware, such as biometric scanners and complex software for feature extraction and biometric template matching, are required if biometric approach is to provide security for protecting sensitive data such as personal health information.

Cryptographic approach, on the other hand, ties data protection mathematically to the Key that is utilized to protect it. This allows a data owner to have complete control over one's personal information without relying on, or relinquishing control to, a third party authority. The protection of personal sensitive information is also not tied to complex software and hardware systems that may need constant patches to security holes.

Biometric authentication and authorization for data protection could be thought of as enabling security based on “what one is.” The lynchpin of biometric security is the use of sufficiently unique, but often imprecise, physiological or behavioral traits to characterize an individual for authentication and identification purposes. The characterization is expressed in form of some biometric signature, which often can be reduced to some feature vector or matrix representation. For example, a biometric face could be expressed in terms of a linearized vector of EigenMap or EigenFace components. The security parameter for assessing the strength of a biometrically based approach is typically related to the size of the underlying feature vector (or matrix) and the number of bits for representing a value, as well as the biometric data distribution leading to inter and intra variability—a main source of false negative or false positive alarms when applying biometric approach for security.

On the other hand, cryptographically based security could be thought of as a security approach based on “what one knows.” The lynchpin of cryptographic security is the secret key for decrypting a cipher text that is the encrypted form of the sensitive data. The security parameter for assessing the strength of a cryptographic approach is typically the key size in terms of the number of bits, and information leakage which can be measured by the information gain on the sensitive data given its corresponding cipher text and the mathematical structure of the cryptographic mechanism for encryption/decryption. In order to mitigate the risk of information leakage, semantic security is desirable.

In theory, the size of a biometric signature or the size of a secret key in cryptography could be increased indefinitely to increase the security strength. In practice, the limitation in the resolution of biometric sensors, among other factors, does not allow the security strength to be scaled proportionally. On the other hand, cryptographic approach has its own drawback too. Since the confidentiality of sensitive data is protected through encryption, one must keep the decryption key as a secret. Generally the secret key is generated and withheld by the party that handles the decryption of the sensitive data. If the secret key is compromised, the confidentiality of the sensitive data is compromised.

Therefore, an improved computational protocol which affords the advantages of both the cryptographic and biometric approaches is desired.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

Disclosed in this specification is a method and program storage device for comparing two sets of private data without revealing those private data. If the comparison deems the two data sets sufficiently similar, helper data may be provided to permit reconstruction of one of the private data sets without transmission of that private data set. An advantage that may be realized in the practice of some disclosed embodiments of the system is the capability of two parties to gauge the similarity of one another's data without needing to reveal that data. In one embodiment, one party can perfectly reconstruct the other party's data without risking the data being intercepted by a third party.

In a first exemplary embodiment, a method for comparing two sets of private data without revealing the data is disclosed. The method computes a first private matrix (A₁) according to the equation A₁=d₁·d₁ ^(T) where d₁ is a first private data expressed as a column vector and d₁ ^(T) is its corresponding transpose. A first eigenvalue (λ_(d1)) and a corresponding unity normalized first eigenvector (V_(d1)) of the first private matrix (A₁) is found. A second party computes a second private matrix (A₂=d₂·d₂ ^(T)) and finds a second eigenvalue (λ_(d2)) and a corresponding unity normalized second eigenvector (V_(d2)) of the second private matrix (A₂). A bisector vector (x) of V_(d1) and V_(d2) is found without the first party or the second party revealing d₁, λ_(d1), d₂, λ_(d2) or V_(d2); whereas the bisector vector (x) can be obtained by solving the equation (d₁·d₁ ^(T)+d₂·d₂ ^(T))x=λ_(d1)V_(d1)+λ_(d2)V_(d2). A determination is then made concerning whether or not (1) an angular deviation between the first eigenvector (V_(d1)) and the second eigenvector (V_(d2)) is within a threshold, or (2) a distance between V_(d1) and V_(d2) is within a threshold, wherein if the threshold is satisfied, the first private data and second private data are deemed sufficiently similar.

In a second exemplary embodiment, a method for comparing two sets of private data without revealing the data and reconstructing one of the private data sets is disclosed. The method computes a first private matrix (A₁) according to the equation A₁=d₁·d₁ ^(T) where d₁ is a first private data expressed as a column vector and d₁ ^(T) is its corresponding transpose. A first eigenvalue (λ_(d1)) and a corresponding unity normalized first eigenvector (V_(d1)) of the first private matrix (A₁) are found. A second party computes a second private matrix (A₂=d₂·d₂ ^(T)) and finds a second eigenvalue (λ_(d2)) and a corresponding unity normalized second eigenvector (V_(d2)) of the second private matrix (A₂). A bisector vector (x) of V_(d1) and V_(d2) is found without the first party or the second party revealing d₁, V_(d1), V_(d1), d₂, λ_(d2) or V_(d2); whereas the bisector vector (x) can be obtained by solving the equation (d₁·d₁ ^(T)+d₂·d₂ ^(T))x=λ_(d1)V_(d1)+λ_(d2)V_(d2). A determination is then made concerning whether or not (1) an angular deviation between the first eigenvector (V_(d1)) and the second eigenvector (V_(d2)) is within a threshold, or (2) a distance between V_(d1) and V_(d2) is within a threshold, wherein if the threshold is satisfied, the first private data and second private data are deemed sufficiently similar. If the data is sufficiently similar, helper data that includes λ_(d2) plus a mathematical operator is sent that permits the first party to reconstruct the second party's private data by combining the helper data with the first private data.

In a third exemplary embodiment, a program storage device is disclosed that tangibly embodies a program of instructions executable by machine to perform the method steps for comparing two sets of private data without revealing the data and reconstructing one of the private data sets. The method computes a first private matrix (A₁) according to the equation A₁=d₁·d₁ ^(T) where d₁ is a first private data expressed as a column vector and d₁ ^(T) is its corresponding transpose. A first eigenvalue (λ_(d1)) and a corresponding unity normalized first eigenvector (V_(d1)) of the first private matrix (A₁) is found. A second party computes a second private matrix (A₂=d₂·d₂ ^(T)) and finds a second eigenvalue (λ_(d2)) and a corresponding unity normalized second eigenvector (V_(d2)) of the second private matrix (A₂). A bisector vector (x) of V_(d1) and V_(d2) is found without the first party or the second party revealing d₁, λ_(d1), V_(d1), d₂, λ_(d2) or V_(d2); whereas the bisector vector (x) can be obtained by solving the equation (d₁·d₁ ^(T) +d₂·d₂ ^(T))x=λ_(d1)V_(d1)+λ_(d2)V_(d2). A determination is then made concerning whether or not (1) an angular deviation between the first eigenvector (V_(d1)) and the second eigenvector (V_(d2)) is within a threshold, or (2) a distance between V_(d1) and V_(d2) is within the threshold, wherein if the threshold is satisfied, the first private data and second private data are deemed sufficiently similar. If the data is sufficiently similar, helper data that includes λ_(d2) plus a mathematical operator is sent that permits the first party to reconstruct the second party's private data by combining the helper data with the first private data.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The present invention is disclosed with reference to the accompanying drawings, wherein:

FIG. 1 depicts of a flow diagram of method 100 for comparing digitally stored private data without revealing the data;

FIG. 2 illustrates the convergence of V_(d1), V_(d2) and x when d₁ and d₂ converge;

FIG. 3 depicts the geometric relationship of V_(d1), V_(d2) and x;

FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram depicting an exemplary method for solving for x;

FIG. 5 is a schematic depiction of one method for reconstructing private data without revealing that data; and

FIG. 6 is a schematic illustration of the locking and unlocking of a biometric fingerprint signature.

Corresponding reference characters indicate corresponding parts throughout the several views. The examples set out herein illustrate several embodiments of the invention but should not be construed as limiting the scope of the invention in any manner.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

In one embodiment, a method for permitting two parties to compare digitally stored private data (e.g. a first and second biometric signature, such as a fingerprint) is provided without either party revealing their respective data. In another embodiment, when the comparison deems the two data sets are sufficiently similar, helper data is provided to the other party that permits the other party to accurately reconstruct the other party's data by combining the helper data with their own data. The data sets are never exchanged. In the event the helper data is intercepted by an undesirable third party, the third party is unable to reconstruct either data set, as they lack a sufficiently similar data set that must be combined with the helper data.

Comparing Private Data without Revealing the Data

FIG. 1 depicts of a flow diagram of method 100 for comparing digitally stored private data without revealing the data. This method may be referred to as the Secure Information Processing with Privacy Assurance (SIPPA) protocol.

In step 102, a first party computes a first private matrix (A₁) by multiplying a first private data (d₁), such as a digital biometric signature, with its transpose (d₁ ^(T)). The first private matrix A₁ is therefore (d₁·d₁ ^(T)). The first private data is expressed as a column vector. In one embodiment, the first party is a client party in a client/server relationship. Examples of first parties include client computers that are in communication with a server. In one embodiment, the first party is a digital audio recorder, digital scanner, cellular telephone, or other similar device. Private data may include personal biometric traits, video surveillance data, and the like. Personal biometric traits include fingerprints, facial features (e.g. facial recognition), voice patterns, and the like.

In step 104, at least one first eigenvalue (λ_(d1)) and at least one corresponding first eigenvector (V_(d1)) is calculated for the first private matrix (A₁). In one embodiment, step 104 calculates the most significant eigenvalue and its corresponding unity-normalized eigenvector of the first private matrix (A₁). A most significant eigenvalue is the eigenvalue with the largest magnitude (e.g. λ_(dk)≧every λ_(d1) for 1=1 . . . n except 1≠k for the set {λ_(d1) . . . λ_(dn)}. When multiple eigenvalues tie as the largest magnitude, each is a most significant eigenvalue.

In step 106, a second party computes a second private matrix (A₂) by multiplying a second private data (d₂) with its transpose (d₂ ^(T)). The second private matrix A₂ is therefore (d₂·d₂ ^(T)). The second private data is expressed as a column vector. In one embodiment, the second party is a server party in a client/server relationship. Examples of second parties include server computers (e.g., a fingerprint database server computer) that are in communication with the client.

In step 108, at least one second eigenvalue (λ_(d2)) and at least one corresponding second eigenvector (V_(d2)) is calculated for the second private matrix (A₂). In one embodiment, step 108 calculates the most significant eigenvalue and its corresponding unity-normalized eigenvector of the second private matrix (A₂).

In step 110 a bisector vector (x) of the equation (d₁·d₁ ^(T)+d₂·d₂ ^(T))x=λ_(d1)V_(d1)+λ_(d2)V_(d2) is computed. As described in detail elsewhere in this specification, the bisector vector (x) can be collaboratively calculated by the first party and the second party without the first party or the second party revealing d₁, λ_(d1), V_(d1), d₂, λ_(d2) or V_(d2).

Either or both parties can use the bisector vector (x), combined with their own data (λd₁V_(d1) or λ_(d2)V_(d2)) to find a vector (e). As described in detail elsewhere in this specification, due to the relationship of the bisector vector (x), V_(d1) and V_(d2) in Eigenspace, the vector (e) is an indicator of the similarity of the underlying data d₁ and d₂, yet neither the first party nor the second party has revealed d₁ or d₂. The party that wishes to determine the deviation between its eigenvector and the other party's eigenvector can do so utilizing bisector vector (x). Suppose that the party with V_(d1) wishes to determine the angular deviation between V_(d1) and V_(d2), this can be done by obtaining the angle between V_(d1) and bisector vector (x). (i.e.; cos⁻¹(V_(d1)·x/(|V_(d1)|·|x|))). The angular deviation between V_(d1) and V_(d2) is then 2*(cos⁻¹(V_(d1)·x/(|V_(d1)|·|x|))). In another embodiment, the estimated magnitude distance between V_(d1)· and V_(d2)· via the magnitude distance between V_(d1)/V_(d2) and x is used instead of, or in addition to, the angular deviation.

In step 112, if d₁ and d₂ are sufficiently similar as determined by either the angular distance or other distance measure such as the Euclidean distance between vectors V_(d1) and V_(d2) as compared against a pre-defined threshold, then subsequent processing steps can be performed such as sending helper data (e.g., sending λ_(d1)/d₁ ^(T)·x to the second party). If the deviation measure is not within a certain pre-defined threshold, each party's data, d₁ and d₂, are deemed dissimilar and alternate subsequent processing steps may be performed. In one embodiment, when each party's data are sufficiently similar, helper data is provided to permit one party to reconstruct the other party's data—yet that data is never exchanged and is therefore not at risk of being intercepted.

Angular or Magnitude Deviation as an Indicator of Similarity

As shown in FIG. 2 and FIG. 3; V_(d1), V_(d2) and x all converge to each other when d₁ and d₂ converge to each other. This convergence gives rise to a geometric relationship between the eigenvectors that permits one to use the vector (e) (either e₁ for the first party or e₂ for the second party) to determine whether V_(d1) and V_(d2) are sufficiently similar or are dissimilar. The first party can solve for e_(l). If e₁ is sufficiently small (e.g. below a predetermined threshold) then the first party knows the second party's data must be similar due to the fact that V_(d1) and V_(d2) each is a unity normalized eigenvector and x their bisector, yet the first party cannot learn anything more. Likewise, the second party can solve for e₂ and, by examining e₂, determine whether or not the first party's data is sufficiently similar to its own data.

The private matrices A₁=d₁·d₁ ^(T) and A₂=d₂·d₂ ^(T) can be thought of as the mapping functions for the eigenvectors and the bisector vector x. The difference between d₁ and d₂ proportionality affects the difference in the mapping functions, which subsequently introduces an angular deviation on the angle between the unity normalized eigenvectors as well as the magnitude deviation as measured by the Euclidean distance between the two eigenvectors scaled by the corresponding eigenvalues. Therefore, angular deviation and magnitude deviation between the client and server eigenvectors can be used to obtain information about the closeness between target and source data. If angular deviation is used as the metric to determine closeness, then both the first party and the second party can privately and precisely determine whether the data of the other party is sufficiently similar without revealing one's own private data. See the section entitled “Reconstructing private data without revealing the data.”

Securely Calculating the Bisector Vector (x)

Consider (d₁·d₁ ^(T)+d₂·d₂ ^(T))x=λ_(d1)V_(d1)+λ_(d2)V_(d2), the solution x=V satisfying (d₁·d₁ ^(T)+d₂·d₂ ^(T))V=λ_(d1)V_(d1)+λ_(d2)V_(d2) has a unity scalar projection onto the unity normalized V_(d1) and V_(d2), and the vector (x) is a bisector for the interior angle between V_(d1) and V_(d2) according to Theorem 1. See the section entitled “Proof of theorem 1.” Theorem 1 shows that there is an algebraic relationship between the symmetric matrix representation of the first party and second party data in the eigenvector space; and the algebraic relationship guarantees the existence of a bisector vector that allows each party to use it to determine whether the first and second party data are sufficiently similar. A variety of protocols can be used to securely calculate the bisector vector (x) without revealing information about either party's private data including d₁, λ_(d1), V_(d1), d₂, λ_(d2) or V_(d2).

In one embodiment, the bisector vector (x) is calculated using the Secure Linear System Solution Protocol (SLSSP). In another embodiment, the bisector vector (x) is calculated using the Privacy-preserving cooperative scientific computation protocol (PPCSC). Both these protocols are discussed elsewhere in this specification.

Brief Primer on an Encryption Function

An ideal encryption function E(p,k) is a one way function which takes in two arguments (p, k) and produces an unique c for each unique (p, k) pair. Where p is some data and k is a key. In the ideal case, if one were to know only the output of E(p,k)=c, and seeks to obtain either p or k, the only recourse available would be an exhaustive search; i.e. one would have to iterate through all the possibilities of p and k, to see if any one combination of (p, k) produces the c, thus obtaining the p or k they seek. An ideal encryption function should also allow for the obtainment of p if c and k are known with relative ease.

Encryption functions are utilized extensively to securely transport secrets primarily over channels where there exists the possibility for an intruder who might be able to intercept the secret. The existence of relatively ideal encryption functions allow for the transport of secrets, where even if the encrypted secret were to be intercepted by a nefarious party (without the knowledge of k) it would take a very long time to obtain p (billions of years using the fastest available computes—if a relatively large k were chosen).

SLSSP Protocol Details—Example

SLSSP primarily utilizes the well-known publically available Paillier additively homomorphic encryption function. The Paillier protocol allows for the following and is thus called an additively homomorphic function. See the section entitled “Paillier Cryptosystem” elsewhere in this specification.

Suppose the following scenario: Multiple persons {P₁, P₂, P₃ . . . P_(n)} would like to vote yes/no for a candidate. It is desirable that the identity of the person who cast any particular vote remain private. Each person P_(i.) possesses a vote V_(i), which is either 0 or 1, Paillier allows each party to encrypt their vote, where the tally (T=V₁+V₂+V₃+ . . . +V_(n)) can be computed without knowledge of the specific value of any of the votes. Specifically, the Paillier function allows some party C (who chooses a secret key k) to send E(n1, k) (a number n1 encrypted in Paillier which can be decrypted with key k) and E(n2, k) to another party D, so that it may perform the operation E(n3, k)=add (E(n2, k)), where E(n3, k)=E(n1+n2, k). Party C which receives E(n3, k) can obtain n3=n1+n2 because it knows k. Paillier guarantees that party D cannot, even with very large amounts of time (billions of years), know n3 nor k nor n1 nor n2.

This SLSSP protocol allows for two parties (a first party and second party) to jointly solve for x in the following equation (A1+A2)x=b1+b2

A1 is a square matrix and b1 is a column vector with the same row dimension as A1. Both A1 and b1 are private to the first party. A2 is a square matrix and b2 is a column vector with the same row dimension as A2. Both A2 and b2 are private to the second party. A1 and A2 are of the same dimension.

This protocol, summarized in Table 1 and FIG. 4, allows for the solution x to be obtained by both parties without each party revealing to the other their respective private data i.e. A1, b1 is not revealed to the second party, and A2, b2 is not revealed to the first.

The following is a numeric illustration of this protocol using exemplary numeric values. It should be understood this non-limiting example is including solely for clarity of illustration. For this illustration, the following is an inventory of what the first party and the second party possess:

The First Party Possesses:

${A\mspace{14mu} 2 \times 2\mspace{14mu} {private}\mspace{14mu} {matrix}\mspace{14mu} A\; 1} = \begin{bmatrix} 32 & 4 \\ 12 & 19 \end{bmatrix}$ ${A\mspace{14mu} 2 \times 1\mspace{14mu} {private}\mspace{14mu} {matrix}\mspace{14mu} b\; 1} = \begin{bmatrix} 11 \\ 3 \end{bmatrix}$ ${A\mspace{14mu} {randomly}\mspace{14mu} {generated}\mspace{14mu} 2 \times 2\mspace{14mu} {matrix}\mspace{14mu} P\; 1} = \begin{bmatrix} 13 & 17 \\ 51 & 8 \end{bmatrix}$ ${A\mspace{14mu} {randomly}\mspace{14mu} {generated}\mspace{14mu} 1 \times 2\mspace{14mu} {matrix}\mspace{14mu} v^{t}} = \begin{bmatrix} 4 & 43 \end{bmatrix}$

A randomly generated Paillier key K_(A)

The Second Party Possesses:

${A\mspace{14mu} 2 \times 2\mspace{14mu} {private}\mspace{14mu} {data}\mspace{14mu} {matrix}\mspace{14mu} A\; 2} = \begin{bmatrix} 67 & 74 \\ 19 & 21 \end{bmatrix}$ ${A\mspace{14mu} 2 \times 1\mspace{14mu} {private}\mspace{14mu} {data}\mspace{14mu} {matrix}\mspace{14mu} b\; 2} = \begin{bmatrix} 54 \\ 83 \end{bmatrix}$ ${A\mspace{20mu} {randomly}\mspace{14mu} {generated}\mspace{14mu} 2 \times 2\mspace{14mu} {matrix}\mspace{14mu} P\; 2} = \begin{bmatrix} 49 & 68 \\ 55 & 9 \end{bmatrix}$

A randomly generated Paillier key K_(B)

Step Step # First Party # Second Party α1 Send E (A1, K_(A)) and β1 Receive E (A1, K_(A)) and E(b1, K_(A)) from E (b1, K_(A)) to SECOND PARTY. FIRST PARTY. Numerically: Numerically: ${Send}\mspace{14mu} {E\left( {\begin{bmatrix} 32 & 4 \\ 12 & 19 \end{bmatrix},K_{A}} \right)}\mspace{14mu} {and}$ ${E\left( {\begin{bmatrix} 11 \\ 3 \end{bmatrix},K_{A}} \right)}\mspace{14mu} {to}\mspace{14mu} {SECOND}$ PARTY. ${{Receive}\mspace{14mu} \left( {\begin{bmatrix} 32 & 4 \\ 12 & 19 \end{bmatrix},K_{A}} \right)},{E\left( {\begin{bmatrix} 11 \\ 3 \end{bmatrix},K_{A}} \right)}$ from  FIRST  PARTY. α2 Receive E(A2, K_(B)) and E(b2, K_(B)) β2 Send E(A2, K_(B)) and E(b2, K_(B)) to FIRST from SECOND PARTY. PARTY. Numerically: Numerically: ${{Receive}\mspace{14mu} \left( {\begin{bmatrix} 67 & 74 \\ 19 & 21 \end{bmatrix},K_{B}} \right)},{{E\left( {\begin{bmatrix} 54 \\ 83 \end{bmatrix},K_{B}} \right)}\mspace{14mu} {from}}$ SECOND  PARTY. ${Send}\mspace{14mu} {E\left( {\begin{bmatrix} 67 & 74 \\ 19 & 21 \end{bmatrix},K_{B}} \right)}\mspace{14mu} {and}$ ${E\left( {\begin{bmatrix} 54 \\ 83 \end{bmatrix},K_{B}} \right)}\mspace{14mu} {to}\mspace{14mu} {FIRST}\mspace{14mu} {{PARTY}.}$ α3 Compute and send to β3 Receive and decrypt matrix obtained from SECOND PARTY: step α3 to obtain a mXm matrix: E(P1(A1 + A2), K_(B)) (P1(A1 + A2)) Numerically: Numerically: Compute and send to Receive and decrypt matrix obtained from SECOND PARTY: step α3 to obtain a mXm matrix: ${E\left( {{\begin{bmatrix} 13 & 17 \\ 51 & 8 \end{bmatrix}\left( {\begin{bmatrix} 32 & 4 \\ 12 & 19 \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} 67 & 74 \\ 19 & 21 \end{bmatrix}} \right)},K_{B}} \right)} = {E\left( {\begin{bmatrix} 1814 & 1694 \\ 5297 & 4298 \end{bmatrix},K_{B}} \right)}$ $\begin{bmatrix} 1814 & 1694 \\ 5297 & 4298 \end{bmatrix}\quad$ α4 Compute E(Y, K_(B)) = β4 Compute the Moore-Penrose Pseudoinverse E(P1(b1 + b2)v^(t), K_(B)) (A type of matrix inverse) of (P1(A1 + A2)) Numerically: to obtain R = ((P1(A1 + A2)))⁻¹ Compute: Numerically: $\begin{matrix} {{E\left( {Y,K_{B}} \right)} = {E\left( {{\begin{bmatrix} 13 & 17 \\ 51 & 8 \end{bmatrix}{\left( {\begin{bmatrix} 11 \\ 3 \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} 54 \\ 83 \end{bmatrix}} \right)\left\lbrack {4,43} \right\rbrack}},K_{B}} \right)}} \\ {= {E\left( {\begin{bmatrix} 9228 & 99201 \\ 16012 & 172129 \end{bmatrix},K_{B}} \right)}} \end{matrix}\quad$ $\begin{matrix} {R = \begin{bmatrix} 1814 & 1694 \\ 5297 & 4298 \end{bmatrix}^{- 1}} \\ {= \begin{bmatrix} {- 0.037} & 0.0014 \\ 0.0045 & {- 0.0015} \end{bmatrix}} \end{matrix}\quad$ α5 Send E(Y, K_(B)) to β5 Receive from FIRST PARTY (Step α5), SECOND and decrypt to obtain Y = P1(b1 + b2)v^(T) PARTY: Numerically: Numerically: Receive from FIRST PARTY (Step α5), Send to SECOND PARTY: and decrypt to obtain ${E\left( {Y,K_{B}} \right)} = {E\left( {\begin{bmatrix} 9228 & 99201 \\ 16012 & 172129 \end{bmatrix},K_{B}} \right)}$ $Y = \begin{bmatrix} 9228 & 99201 \\ 16012 & 172129 \end{bmatrix}$ α6 Send E((v^(t))⁻¹, K_(A)), to SECOND PARTY, β6 Receive E((v^(t))⁻¹, K_(A)) from step α6 and where (v^(t))⁻¹ is the Moore- compute X1, utilizing Y. Send E(X1, K_(B)) Penrose Pseudoinverse (A to FIRST PARTY. type of matrix inverse) of (v^(t))) E(X1, K_(B)) = ((R * Y), K_(B)) Numerically: Numerically: Send to SECOND PARTY: Send to FIRST PARTY: ${E\left( {\left( v^{t} \right)^{- 1},K_{A}} \right)} = {E\left( {\begin{bmatrix} 0.0021 \\ 0.0231 \end{bmatrix},K_{A}} \right)}$ $\begin{matrix} {{E\left( {{X\; 1},K_{B}} \right)} = {E\left( {\left( {R\;*Y} \right),K_{B}} \right)}} \\ {= {E\left( {\left( {\begin{bmatrix} {- 0.037} & 0.0014 \\ 0.0045 & {- 0.0015} \end{bmatrix}*\begin{bmatrix} 9228 & 99201 \\ 16012 & 172129 \end{bmatrix}} \right),K_{B}} \right)}} \\ {= {E\left( {\left( \begin{bmatrix} {- 10.6563} & {- 114.5551} \\ 16.8586 & 181.2302 \end{bmatrix} \right),K_{B}} \right)}} \end{matrix}\quad$ α7 Receive E(X1, K_(B)) from SECOND PARTY, (step β7 Compute the encrypted solution E(x, K_(A)) β6) and compute the encrypted solution E(x, K_(B)) by multiplying (R * Y) to E((v^(t))⁻¹, K_(A)) by multiplying (v^(t))⁻¹ to E(X1, K_(B)) i.e. i.e. E(x, K_(B)) = E(X1 * (v^(t))⁻¹, K_(B)) E(x, K_(A)) = E(R * Y * (v^(t))⁻¹, K_(A)) Numerically: Numerically: $\begin{matrix} {{E\left( {x,K_{B}} \right)} = {E\left( {{X\; 1*\left( v^{t} \right)^{- 1}},K_{B}} \right)}} \\ {= {E\left( {{\begin{bmatrix} {- 10.6563} & {- 114.5551} \\ 16.8586 & 181.2302 \end{bmatrix}\begin{bmatrix} 0.0021 \\ 0.0231 \end{bmatrix}},K_{B}} \right)}} \\ {= {E\left( {x,K_{B}} \right)}} \\ {= {E\left( {\begin{bmatrix} {- 2.6641} \\ 4.2147 \end{bmatrix},K_{B}} \right)}} \end{matrix}\quad$ $\begin{matrix} {{E\left( {x,K_{A}} \right)} = {E\left( {{R*Y*\left( v^{t} \right)^{- 1}},K_{A}} \right)}} \\ {= {E\left( {{R*Y*\left( v^{t} \right)^{- 1}},K_{A}} \right)}} \\ {= {E\begin{pmatrix} {\begin{bmatrix} {- 0.037} & 0.0014 \\ 0.0045 & {- 0.0015} \end{bmatrix}*} \\ {{\begin{bmatrix} 9228 & 99201 \\ 16012 & 172129 \end{bmatrix}*\begin{bmatrix} 0.0021 \\ 0.0231 \end{bmatrix}},K_{A}} \end{pmatrix}}} \\ {= {E\left( {x,K_{B}} \right)}} \\ {= {E\left( {\begin{bmatrix} {- 2.6641} \\ 4.2147 \end{bmatrix},K_{A}} \right)}} \end{matrix}\quad$ α8 Send E(x, K_(B)) to SECOND PARTY β8 Receive E(x, K_(B)) from FIRST PARTY Numerically: (Step α8) and decrypt to Send to obtain the solution x SECOND PARTY Numerically: $E\left( {\begin{bmatrix} {- 2.6641} \\ 4.2147 \end{bmatrix},K_{B}} \right)$ $x = \begin{bmatrix} {- 2.6641} \\ 4.2147 \end{bmatrix}$ α9 Receive E(x, K_(A)) from FIRST PARTY (Step β9) β9 Send E(x, K_(A)) to FIRST PARTY and decrypt to Obtain the solution x Numerically: Numerically: Send to FIRST PARTY $x = \begin{bmatrix} {- 2.6641} \\ 4.2147 \end{bmatrix}$ $E\left( {\begin{bmatrix} {- 2.6641} \\ 4.2147 \end{bmatrix},K_{A}} \right)$

To Numerically Verify the Solution:

${\left( {{A\; 1} + {A\; 2}} \right)*x} = {{\left( {\begin{bmatrix} 32 & 4 \\ 12 & 19 \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} 67 & 74 \\ 19 & 21 \end{bmatrix}} \right)*\begin{bmatrix} {- 2.6641} \\ 4.2147 \end{bmatrix}} = \begin{bmatrix} 65 \\ 86 \end{bmatrix}}$ $\left( {{b\; 1} + {b\; 2}} \right) = \begin{bmatrix} 65 \\ 86 \end{bmatrix}$

Privacy-Preserving Cooperative Scientific Computation Protocol

The definitions for left and right homomorphic encryption over matrices are listed below before we present the privacy-preserving cooperative scientific computation protocol:

Definition 1: Given a scalar secret key k, and a scalar message m, homomorphic encryption, denoted by E(k, m), is an encryption with the following properties: E(k,m)^(c)=E(k,mc), E(k,m1)·E(k,m2)=E(k,m1+m2); where c is a scalar constant.

Definition 2: A simple homomorphic encryption is a homomorphic encryption with the mathematical formulation E(k,m)=k^(m).

Definition 3: Given a scalar secret key k, and a m×m matrix message A=[a_(ij)]_(i=1..m,j=1..m,) a left homomorphic encryption, denoted by E_(L)(k,M), is an encryption satisfying two properties:

E _(L)(k,A)^(B) =E(k,B·A)=E(k,[(Σ_(j) b _(ij) a _(jk))_(ik)]_(i=1..m,kz=1..m))   (i)

E(k,A)·E(k,B)=E(k,A+B); where B=[b _(ij)]_(i=1..m,j=1..m) is a m×m matrix   (ii)

Definition 4: Given a scalar secret key k, and a m×n matrix message A=[a_(ij)]_(i=1..m,j=1..m), a right homomorphic encryption, denoted by E_(R)(k,A), is an encryption satisfying two properties:

E _(R)(k,A)^(B) =E(k,A·B)=E(k,[(Σ_(j) a _(ij) b _(jk))_(ik)]_(i=32 1..m ,k=1..m))   (i)

E(k,A)·E(k,B)=E(k,A+B); where B=[b _(ij)]_(i=1..m,j=1..m) is a m×m matrix.

Algorithm 1: Realization of left homomorphic operation E_(L)(k,A)^(B)=E(k,B·A)=E(k,[(Σ_(j)b_(ij)a_(jk))_(ik)]_(i=1..m,k=1..m))

In the first step, P1 sends P2, one at a time, E(k,a_(ij))=k^(a) ^(ij) , where i=1..m, j=1..m. In the second step, compute for i=1..m, k=1..m

${\prod\limits_{j = 1}^{m}\; {E\left( {k,a_{jk}} \right)}^{b_{ij}}} = {{\prod\limits_{j = 1}^{m}\; k^{b_{ij}a_{jk}}} = {k^{\sum\limits_{j = 1}^{m}{b_{ij}a_{jk}}} = \left. {E\left( {k,{\sum\limits_{j = 1}^{m}{b_{ij}a_{jk}}}} \right)} \right|}}$

In the third step, a matrix is constructed.

$\left\lbrack \left( {E\left( {k,{\sum\limits_{j = 1}^{m}{b_{ij}a_{jk}}}} \right)} \right)_{i,k} \right\rbrack_{{i = {1{\ldots m}}},{k = \; {1\; \ldots \; m}}} = {E\left( {k,{B \cdot A}} \right)}$

Algorithm 2: Realization of right homomorphic operation E_(R)(k,A)^(B)=E(k,A·B)=E(k,[(Σ_(j)a_(ij)b_(jk))_(ik)]_(i=1..m,k=1..m)).

In the first step, P1 sends P2, one at a time, E(k,a_(ij))=k^(a) ^(ij) , where i=1..m, j=1..m. In the second step, compute for i=1..m, k=1..m.

${\prod\limits_{j = 1}^{m}\; {E\left( {k,a_{ij}} \right)}^{b_{jk}}} = {{\prod\limits_{j = 1}^{m}\; k^{a_{ij}b_{jk}}} = {k^{\sum\limits_{j = 1}^{m}{a_{ij}b_{jk}}} = {E\left( {k,{\sum\limits_{j = 1}^{m}{a_{ij}b_{jk}}}} \right)}}}$

In the third step, a matrix is constructed.

$\left\lbrack \left( {E\left( {k,{\sum\limits_{j = 1}^{m}{a_{ij}b_{jk}}}} \right)} \right)_{i,k} \right\rbrack_{{i = {1{\ldots m}}},{k = \; {1\; \ldots \; m}}} = {E\left( {k,{B \cdot A}} \right)}$

Privacy-preserving cooperative scientific computation (PPCSC) is a conventional protocol that solves a two-party secure computation problem leading to a value of x satisfying (A1+A2)x=b1+b2. Where matrix A1 and vector b1 belong to party P1, matrix A2 and vector b2 belong to party P2. At the end of protocol, both parties know the solution x while no party knows the other's party's private inputs, i.e. in this case, party P1 cannot derive A2 nor b2, and party P2 cannot derive A1 nor b1.

PPCSC Protocol formulation: 2-party secure computation protocol for solving the algebraic system (Σ_(i=1,2) A_(i))x=Σ_(i=1,2) b_(i).

Instead of solving directly (Σ_(i=1,2) A_(i))x=Σ_(i=1,2) b_(i), we instead solve P₁(A₁+A₂)P₂y=P₁(b₁+b₂)

P₁(A₁+A₂)x=P₁(b₁+b₂), and recover x from P₂y; where P₁ and P₂ are random matrices generated by party 1 and party 2 respectively. By applying Singular Value Decomposition to P₁ and P₂, we obtain P₁=U₁S₁V₁ ^(T) and P₂=U₂S₂V₂ ^(T); where U_(i) ^(T)U_(i)=V_(i)V_(i) ^(T)=I (identity matrix), and S_(i) are diagonal matrices; for i=1,2. The process of 2-party secure computation for solving P₁(A₁+A₂)P₂x=P₁(b₁+b₂) is realized as below:

P1: (Party 1), P2: (Party 2)

Step I Content: V₁ ^(T)A₁

Sender: P1 with (A₁, b₁, P₁=U₁S₁V₁ ^(T)) Receiver: P2

Step 2 Content: E_(L)(k₂, V₁ ^(T)A₁U₂S₂), E_(L)(k₂, A₂U₂S₂)

Sender: P2 with (A₂, b₂, P₂=U₂S₂V₂ ^(T)) Receiver: P1

Step 3 Content: E_(L)(k₂, V₁ ^(T)A₁U₂S₂)^(U1S1)·E_(L)(k₂, A₂U₂S₂)^(P1)=E_(L)(k₂,P₁(A₁+A₂)U₂S₂)

Sender: P1 with (A₁, b₁, P₁) Receiver: P2

Remark: P2 can construct P₁(A₁+A₂)P₂ by decrypting LE(k₂,P₁(A₁+A₂)U₂S₂) and multiplying the decrypted outcome with V₂ ^(T)

Step 4 Content: E_(R)(k₁, c₁P₁b₁), E_(R)(k₁, c₁P₁) where c₁ is a random scalar generated by party P1

Sender: P1 with (A₁, b₁, P₁, c₁) Receiver: P2

Step 5 Content: E_(R)(k_(l), c₁P₁b₁)^(c2)·E_(R)(k₁, c₁p₁)^(c2b2)E_(R)(k₁, c₁c₂P₁(b₁+b₂)) where c₂ is a random scalar generated by party P2

Sender: P2 with (A₂, b₂, P₂, c₂) Receiver: P1

Step 6 Content: c₂P₁(b₁+b₂)

Sender: P1 with (A₁, b₁, P₁, c₁) Receiver: P2

Remark: From step 3 and 6, P2 constructs P₁(A₁+A₂)P₂x=P₁(b₁+b₂) and solves x.

Reconstructing Private Data without Revealing the Data

We have now discussed SLSSP and PPCSC protocols. We now will discuss the reconstruction of private data without revealing the data using SLSSP/PPCSC protocols.

The source data of either party can be perfectly reconstructed by the other party if (1) their respective data is sufficiently similar and (2) a carefully scaled eigenvalue of the symmetric matrix representation of the source data is given. In other words, this scaled eigenvalue serves as the helper data—and the only data—that one party needs to share with the other party; thus the privacy of both parties is preserved. Generically, see FIG. 5 which schematically depicts the regeneration of a decryption key.

For example, consider (d₁·d₁ ^(T)+d₁d₂ ^(T))x=λ_(d1)V_(d1)+λ_(d2)V_(d2), d₁ can be efficiently reconstructed—with an accuracy proportional to the closeness between V_(d1) and V_(d2)—by the second party with d₂, λ_(d2), and V_(d2) when (i) the interior angle between V_(d1) and V_(d2) is less than 90 degree and (ii) the second party is given the bisector vector (x) and the value of λ_(d1)/d₁ ^(T)·x, even when λ_(d1) and d₁ ^(T) which were used to calculate this value are not given. See the section entitled “Proof of theorem 4.” Specifically, d₁=(est_V_(d1)/|est_V_(d1)|)(λ_(d1)/d₁ ^(T)x); where

est_V_(d1)=V_(d2)+[|V_(d2)|·tan(2 cos⁻¹(V_(d2)·x/(|V_(d2)|·|x|)))]·[(x−V_(d2))/|x−V_(d2)|]

The angular deviation can be derived from 2 cos⁻¹(V_(d2)·x/(|V_(d2)|·|x|)) or 2 cos⁻¹(V_(d1)·x/(|V_(d1)|·|x|)). If bisector vector (x) is known (from step 110), each party with one's own eigenvector (V_(d1) or V_(d2)) can derive the angular deviation. By collaborating to solve for bisector vector (x) in the algebraic system (d₁·d₁ ^(T)+d₂·d₂ ^(T))x=λ_(d1)V_(d1)+λ_(d2)V_(d2) while each party will keep one's data, eigenvalue and eigenvector private, each party can solve for either e₁ or e₂, thereby permitting each party to determine whether their data is sufficiently similar to the other party's data. Furthermore, the security and privacy will defer to the particular security and privacy of the two-party secure computation protocol for solving the algebraic system for the bisector vector (x). If the protocol for solving for the bisector vector (x) is secure, then the data of each of the parties is also secure.

The protocol (SIPPA) permits a first party to reconstruct source data of a second party when (1) the first party possesses some first party data that is a “sufficiently good approximation” of the second party's source data and (2) rather than revealing the second party's source data to the first party, only some helper data related to the Eigen components of the second party's source data is provided (by the second party) to the first party for reconstructing the second party's source data. The second party retains complete control over the sharing of helper data—thus keeping private the second party's source data—based on the “closeness” between the first and second party's data. The second party can determine the “closeness” between the first party's data and the second party's data without the first party ever disclosing it's data to the second party—thus the privacy of both client and server data is respected. Only if the first party and second party's data are sufficiently close and the second party sends the first party the helper data, the first party can perfectly reconstruct the second party's source data. This method uses computational geometry that allows perfect data reconstruction from the solution of the bisector vector (x).

The party at issue can also send (λ_(d))^(0.5) as the helper data to allow perfect reconstruction for d₁=(est_V_(d)/|est_V_(d)|)(λ_(d))^(0.5) because (1) λ_(d)=d^(T)·d =|d|², (2) d/d|d|=V_(d) or d=|d|·V_(d), and (3) est_V_(d)/|est_V_(d)|=V_(d) if we are to realize unconditional source data reconstruction.

First Exemplary Embodiment—Fingerprints

The first embodiment of this invention is privacy preserving fingerprint biometrics; more specifically, private reconstruction of fingerprint signatures represented by finger code format. For proof of concept, this invention is applied to, and its effectiveness is assessed by using, the publicly available CASIA-FingerprintV5 database. The database contains five different digital impressions of each finger from 500 subjects. Each of these fingerprint images were converted to custom finger code format (as described in FIG. 6), which yields a 320×1 vector. NEUROtechnology's VERIFINGER SDK was utilized to orient and extract minutia, core points from the fingerprint images. For each session, a random key of size 320×1 of integers in the range 0 and 255 (i.e., 320×256=81920 bits) was generated (K), to which the finger code vector (T) is added to obtain the vector (K+T). Party A possesses the key vector (K), whereas Party B possesses the vector (K+T). An impostor session is generated by subtracting the finger code vector of a finger other than (T) from (K+T) to yield (IM), whereas a true user session is generated by subtracting the fingercode vector of a different impression of (T) to yield (TU). SIPPA was utilized as the matching function which compares [(K) vs (IM)] or [(K) vs (TU)] where the similarity score can either be the angle between the securely computed vector (X) (vector X is the final output of SLSSP) and (K), or the Euclidean distance between the vector (X) and (K).

Performance Study of Fingerprint Reconstruction

An experiment was conducted to determine the performance of SIPPA with various vector sizes, i.e., the 320×1 vector was split into 10×1, 16×1 and 20×1 vectors. Each of these splits yields a vector X_(i), 100 such experiments were conducted (dual-core 3 Ghz machine with 4 Gb RAM) with actual fingerprint data at each split size (10,16, 20).

Since SLSSP is theoretically guaranteed to produce a correct solution x, we conducted our experiment by replacing SLSSP with a standard linear algebra package (EJML) to solve for x in the algebraic system (de·de^(T)+dv·dv^(T))x=λ_(de)V_(de)+λ_(dv)V_(dv). The error between SLSSP's solution x, and the solution produced EJML was determined experimentally to be always less than 4.77E-8 in over 6800 trials. To assess SIPPA's ability to securely distinguish between True Users and Impostors we obtained over 20,000 unique True User sessions (20 k-TU) and 20,000 unique Impostor sessions (20 k-IM) from the extensive CASIA-FingerprintV5 database as described in the previous paragraphs. The ROC plot for (20 k-TU) with (20 k-IM) is provided in (FIG. 2) “SIPPA-2.0—Secure Information Processing with Privacy Assurance (version 2.0),” (Proc. of the 10th Annual Conference on Privacy, Security, and Trust, Paris, France, July). 2012. Parameters used in obtaining the ROC included, a SIPPA split dimension of 10X1, the 32 Angular Deviation (Ang) scores (AngGM(R-X)) per session was aggregated into one similarity score by obtaining their Geometric Mean. Experiments were also conducted at other split dimensions i.e. 15, 20; however they produced inferior or similar results with an exponentially increased processing times. Of the over 50,000 instances where helper data was sent to reconstruct the random key R, R was always reconstructed successfully except 6 instances out of the over 50,000 instances. Applicants postulate that this is due to the sensitivities in finite precision arithmetic. In these 6 instances, the number of errors in the 320 integers constituting the random key R ranges between one and four. To safeguard against this remote possibility, R can be encoded in error correction codes, allowing for correcting R when the reconstruction fails due to a few errors.

Second Exemplary Embodiment—Generation & Retrieval of Cryptographic Keys from Fingerprints

The generation and retrieval of cryptographic keys from fingerprints is another exemplary embodiment of this invention. The description here references the disclosure and the diagrammatic PPHM illustration in the provisional application 61//505,563.

A modified finger-code approach is used to represent a fingerprint as an attribute vector. Several concentric circles are extended from a chosen core point; these concentric circles are further divided into sectors. Each of the sectors forms the boundary of one coding region representing the fingerprint. The Euclidean distance of the farthest and closest minutia points within each coding region in relation to the core point is normalized to a value between 0 and 255. These values make up the above described attribute vector. The length of the attribute vector; i.e., the number and area of each coding region is a variable chosen for optimal performance.

In this embodiment, generation of a cryptographic Key utilizable with strong symmetric encryption algorithms such as AES256 is straightforward. The Key generation phase essentially involves generation of a vector called the k-vector, whose length exactly equals the attribute vector. The k-vector consists of a series of random integers between 0 and 255. A fingerprint template attribute vector (T) is obtained to lock the k-vector (K); elementary addition of the two vectors (K+T) produces the locked vector (K_(L)). The unlocking process begins by deriving an error laden version of K. This is done by procuring a fingerprint sample attribute vector (S), and elementary subtraction (K_(L)−S) to obtain an error laden k-vector (K_(E)). K_(E) typically is not exactly identical to K. It cannot be directly utilized for the decryption of data encrypted with K. Measuring any physical object produces an error between measurements. Hence it is unlikely that matching minutia points in T and S will completely cancel each other during the locking and unlocking process.

Our secure computation protocol SIPPA described in this invention is utilized to determine the deviation between K_(E) and K. If the party with K_(E) deems sufficient similar, it will send helper data (as described elsewhere in this specification) which allows the party with K_(E) to derive K.

A perfect copy of K is retained at a third party called the SIPPA server, and the SIPPA client engages with the SIPPA server utilizing K_(E) to obtain a reconstruction of K, if the server deems similarity. SIPPA also guarantees that no information that each of the parties possesses will leak to the other party in the case where T & S are dissimilar.

Third Exemplary Embodiment—Emergency Health Data Retrieval

In another embodiment, the protocols described herein are used for emergency health data management on a smart-phone device. The description here references the disclosure of SIPPA based PPHM illustration in the provisional application 61//505,563.

In the enrollment process, the emergency health data of the individual is first encrypted and stored in the shared preference of his/her smart-phone device. Furthermore, the fingerprint of the individual, together with a random noise vector generated by a third party, are used to encode the decryption key, and the encoded decryption key is also stored in the shared preference.

During the retrieval process, the emergency responder will first establish a WiFi connection with the individual's smart-phone device and retrieve the encrypted personal emergency health data and the encoded decryption key. The emergency responder will then use a built-in or wireless fingerprint scanner to capture the individual's fingerprint for decoding the decryption key. The decoded fingerprint is then transmitted to the third party for noise removal to arrive at a sufficiently close decryption key. The third party then acts as a SIPPA client to interact with the SIPPA server, and reconstruct the original decryption key based on the helper data provided by the SIPPA server. The reconstructed original key is sent back to the emergency responder for decrypting the personal emergency health data.

Proof of Theorem 1

Theorem 1: Consider (d₁·d₁ ^(T)+d₂·d₂ ^(T))x=λ_(d1)V_(d1)+λ_(d2)V_(d2), the solution x=v satisfying (d₁·d₁ ^(T)+d₂·d₂ ^(T))v=λ_(d1)V_(d1)+λ_(d2)V_(d2) has a unity scalar projection onto the unity normalized V_(d1) and V_(d2), and is a bisector for the interior angle between V_(d1) and V_(d2).

Proof: By the definition of Eigen vectors and values, d₁·d₁ ^(T)·V_(d1)=λ_(d1)V_(d1). Since d₁ ^(T)·V_(d1) is a scalar, d₁ and V_(d1) has the same directionality. Furthermore, d₁/|d₁|=V_(d1) because V_(d1) is a unity normalized vector. Similarly, d₂/|d₂|=V_(d2), and the following results can be established:

d ₁ /|d ₁ |=V _(d1) d ₁ ·d ₁ ^(T) ·V _(d1)=λ_(d1) v _(d1)

(d ₁ /|d ₁|)·(|d₁ |·d ₁ ^(T) ·V _(d1))=(V _(d1))(λ_(d1))

λ_(d1) =d ₁ ^(T) ·d ₁

d ₂ /|d ₂ |=V _(d2) d ₂ ·d ₂ ^(T) ·hd d2 =λ_(d2) V _(d2)

(d ₂ /|d ₂|)·(|d ₂ |·d ₂ ^(T) ·V _(d2))=(V _(d2))(λ_(d2))

λ_(d2) =d ₂ ^(T) ·d ₂

To prove theorem 1, one must prove that (1) v has a unity scalar projection onto the unity normalized d₁ and d₂, and (2) V is a bisector.

To prove V has a unity scalar projection onto the unity normalized V_(d1) and V_(d2), it is sufficient to show V_(d1)·v=V_(d2)·v=1, or (d₁/|d₁|)·v=(d₂/|d₂|)·v=1. Since v is a solution to (d₁·d₁ ^(T)+d₂·d₂ ^(T))x=λ_(d1)v_(d1)+λ_(d2)V_(d2), the right hand side (RHS) and the left hand side (LHS) may be re-written as below:

LHS=(d ₁ ·d ₁ ^(T) +d ₂ +d ₂ ^(T))v=d ₁·(d₁ ^(T) ·v)+d ₂·(d ₂ ^(T) ·v)=|d ₁ |·d ₁·(d ₁ ^(T) ·v/|d ₁|)+|d ₂ |·d ₂·(d ₂ ^(T) ·v/|d ₂|)

RHS=λ_(d1) V _(d1) +λ _(d2) V _(d2) =d ₁ ^(T) ·d ¹·(d₁ /|d ₁|)+d ₂ ^(T) ·d ₂·(d ₂ /|d ₂|)=|d ₁ |·d ₁ +|d ₂ |·d ₂ because d₁ ^(T) ·d ₁ =|d ¹|² and d₂ ^(T) ·d ₂ =|d ₂|²

Comparing the terms on the RHS and LHS, when d₁ and d₂ are linearly independent, d₁ ^(T) ·v/|d ₁|=1

(d₁/|d₁|)·v=V_(d1)·v =1 and d₂ ^(T)·V/|d₂|=1

(d₂/|d₂|)·V=V_(d2)·V=1. Therefore, v has a unity scalar projection onto the unity normalized d₁ and d₂. This completes the proof for (1). The scalar projection of V onto V_(d1) is one, and so as the scalar projection of V onto V_(d2). By the theorem of bisector, V is the bisector of the interior angle of V_(d1) and V_(d2). This completes the proof for (2).

Proof of Theorem 2

Theorem 2: Two-party secure computation involving left/right homomorphic encryption over square matrices is information-theoretic secure asymmetrically; i.e., one party has more information than the other under non-degenerative case.

Proof: Without the loss of generality, we consider the case of left homomorphic encryption in which P1 sends E_(L)(k,A) to P2, and P2 returns E_(L)(k,B·A); whereas both A and B are both m×m matrices.

Referring to step 1 of algorithm 1, P2 receives from P1 m×m terms whereas each term is in form of E(k,a_(ij))=k^(a) ^(ij) , where i=1..m, j=1..m. P2 observes m×m values sent by Pl. But there are (m×m+1) unknowns (the additional term is due to the encryption key k).

Suppose the value range for each unknown is a set of n possible values, the expected information content revealed by an unknown, due to Shannon entropy, is then —Σ_(i=)1..n P_(i) log (P_(i)) where P_(i) is the probability of the unknown assuming the i^(th) value. Without any prior knowledge on the content of the matrix A and the encryption key k, each term can be assumed to be iid (independent and identically distributed) over its value range. Therefore, the chance of each unknown to assume a specific possible value is 1/n. As n approaches infinity, the expected information content gained by P2 is then:

${\underset{n\rightarrow\infty}{Lim}\left\lbrack {- {\sum\limits_{i = 1}^{n}{P_{i}{{Log}\left( P_{i} \right)}}}} \right\rbrack} = 0.$

100971 Therefore, it is information-theoretic secure from P1's perspective. However, the content of matrix B is not information-theoretically secured under the homomorphic encryption over matrices.P1 receives m×m terms from P2; whereas each term after decryption is a linear combination of the matrix elements in B.

$\left. \left\lbrack \left( {\sum\limits_{j = 1}^{m}{b_{ij}a_{jk}}} \right) \right)_{i,k} \right\rbrack_{{i = {1{\ldots m}}},{k = \; {1\; \ldots \; m}}}$

Since there are only m×m elements in B and P1 receives m×m terms of which each is a linear combination of the m×m elements of B, P1 can fully reconstruct the content of matrix B unless the set of the linear combinations is degenerative. Or P1 will know the content of B held by P2, but P2 does not gain additional information from P1; thus the information-theoretical security is asymmetrical.

Proof of Theorem 3

Theorem 3: Two-party secure computation constructed by at least one composition of the product-of-exponentiation operations defined by the properties of left/right homomorphic encryption over square matrices is information theoretic secure for both parties.

Proof: Suppose P1 has a m×m matrix A, P2 has two m×m matrices B and C, we need to show that E(k,A)^(B) E(k,A)^(C) is information-theoretic secure for both parties; i.e., P1 cannot learn the content of B nor the content of C, while P2 cannot learn the content of A.

By the properties in the definition for the left homomorphic encryption:

${{E_{L}\left( {k,A} \right)}^{B} \cdot {E_{L}\left( {k,A} \right)}^{C}} = {{E_{L}\left( {k,{\left( {B + C} \right)A}} \right)} = \left\lbrack {\left( {E\left( {k,{\sum\limits_{j = 1}^{m}{\left( {b_{ij} + c_{ij}} \right)a_{jk}}}} \right)}_{i,k} \right\rbrack_{{i = 1},m,{k = 1},m}.} \right.}$

Upon the completion of the step in the algorithm for homomorphic encryption, P1 receives m×m terms from P2 while there are 2·m×m unknown terms. Therefore, P1 cannot learn the content of matrix B and that of matrix C. By theorem 2, P2 gains no information in the algorithmic step. Therefore, the composition of the product-of-exponentiation operations defined by the properties of left/right homomorphic encryption over square matrices is information-theoretic secure for both parties.

Proof of Theorem 4

Theorem 4 Consider (d₁·d₁ ^(T)+d₂·d₂ ^(T))x=λ_(d1)v_(d1)+λ_(d2)V_(d2), d₁ can be efficiently reconstructed—with an accuracy proportional to the closeness between V_(d1) and V_(d2)—by a party with d₂, λ_(d2), and V_(d2) when (i) the interior angle between V_(d1) and V_(d2) is less than 90 degree and (ii) the party is given x and λ_(d1)/d₁ ^(T)·x. Specifically, d₁=(est_V_(d1)/|est_V_(d1)|)(λ_(d1)/d₁ ^(T)x); where

est_(—) V _(d1) =V _(d2) +[|V _(d2)|·tan(2 cos⁻¹(V_(d2) ·x/(|V _(d2) |·|x|)))]·[(x−V _(d2))/|x−V _(d2)|]

Proof: Let x=V_(d1)+e1 and x=V_(d2)+e2. The length of te (as shown in FIG. 3) can be derived, which is a vector with the same directionality as that of the vector e₂ when the interior angle between V_(d1) and V_(d2) is less than 90 degree. Specifically, V_(d2) and e₂ are orthogonal (i.e., they are perpendicular of each other). The length of te=|te|=[|V_(d2)|·tan(2 cos⁻¹(V_(d2)·x/(|V_(d2)|·|x|)))] because e1=e₂ and the angle between V_(d2) and (V_(d2)+te) is twice the angle between V_(d2) and x (theorem 1). Therefore, te=|te|·[e₂/|e₂|]=[|V_(d2)·tan(2 cos⁻¹(V_(d2)·x/(|V_(d2)|·|x|)))]·[e₂/|e₂|]. Since V_(d2)+te=est_V_(d1)) produces a vector with the same directionality as V_(d1), and V_(d1) is a unity normalized vector, one can conveniently derive V_(d1) by normalizing est_V_(d1); i.e., V_(d1)=est_V_(d1)/|est_V_(d1)|. Finally, since d₁·d₁ ^(T)x≈λ_(d1)V_(d1), we can derive d₁ from (λ_(d1)/d₁ ^(T)·x)·V_(d1) or (λ_(d1)/d₁ ^(T)·x)·(est_V_(d1)/|est_V_(d1)|) with an approximation error proportional to the closeness between V_(d1) and V_(d2). Q.E.D.

Paillier Cryptosystem

The Paillier encryption scheme is a probabilistic, asymmetric, public-key cryptosystem whose security is based on the hypothetical intractability of the Decisional Composite Residuosity Assumption (DCRA). The Paillier encryption function PE(m, r), a bijection (

×

→

) encrypts a message m by raising a basis g to the power m, then multiplying g^(m) with a random r^(n) and reducing the product (g^(m)·r^(n)) modulo n²where n is the public modulus. An important consequence of this approach is that the Paillier Cryptosystem is additively homomorphic, specifically the following properties hold:

-   -   1. ((PE(m₁, r₁)·PE(m₂, r₂)) mod n²)=PE(m₁+m₂, r₁·r₂)     -   2. ((PE(m₁, r₁)·g^(m2))mod n²)=PE(m₁+m₂, r₁)     -   3. ((PE(m₁, r₁)^(m2))mod n²)=PE(m₁·m₂ , r₁)

Paillier Key Generation:

-   -   1. Choose a modulus n=p·q. The modulus is chosen in accordance         with the RSAES-OAEP specification, where n has the properties of         a well-chosen RSA modulus.     -   2. Choose a random g ∈         *_(n) ₂ ensure that the order of g in modulo n² is a multiple of         n, if not choose another g until the requirement is met.     -   3. Compute λ=λ(n)=1 cm((p−1), (q−1)), where λ(n) is the         Carmichael function.     -   4. Let

${{L(u)} = \frac{\left( {u - 1} \right)}{n}},$

compute μ=(L(g^(λ) mod n²)) mod n.

5. The Paillier public-key pair is (g, n).

-   -   6. The Paillier private-key pair is (λ, μ).

The Paillier Encryption Function PE(m,r):

Given a Paillier public-key pair, choose a message to be encrypted m ∈

, and a random r chosen uniformly from

, then the Paillier encryption function is defined as PE(m, r)=(g^(m)·r^(n))mod n². PE(m, r) is a bijection (

×

→

) which produces a ciphertext (c ∈

).

The Paillier Decryption Function PD(c):

Given a Paillier public-key, private-key pair and a Paillier ciphertext c ∈

, then the Paillier decryption function is defined as:

PD(c)=(L(c ^(λ)mod n ²)·μ)mod n

Fixed Point Representation

The Paillier cryptosystem operates over a finite field

, we extend the cryptosystem to operate over the reals utilizing a simple Fixed Point representation scheme. Let s ∈

be some exponent of 10, then for every r ∈

, r is represented as (└10^(s)r┘) ∈

. An approximation of r, can be obtained by

$\overset{\sim}{r} = \frac{\left\lfloor {10^{s}r} \right\rfloor}{10^{s}}$

∈

, specifically:

-   1. For any r ∈     ⁺, a Paillier ciphertext is obtained by PE(└10^(s)r┘, x), where x is     some random and

$\overset{\sim}{r} = {\frac{{PD}\left( {{PE}\left( {\left\lfloor {10^{s}r} \right\rfloor,x} \right)} \right)}{10^{s}}.}$

-   2. For any r ∈     ⁻, a Paillier ciphertext is obtained by PE (n+└10^(s)r┘, x), where n     is the Paillier modulus and

$\overset{\sim}{r} = \frac{{{PD}\left( {{PE}\left( {{n + \left\lfloor {10^{s}r} \right\rfloor},x} \right)} \right)} - n}{10^{s}}$

It is to be noted that representing reals with a fixed point representation introduces errors due to truncation, which is directly proportional to the size of s chosen. The domain of the encryption function is also truncated from

_(n) to

$\left\{ {0,{1,\mspace{11mu} {\ldots \; \cdot \left\lfloor \frac{n - 1}{10^{s}} \right\rfloor}}} \right\},$

whereas extending the fixed point scheme to include negative reals further reduces the encryption domain to

$\left\{ {0,{1,\mspace{11mu} {\ldots \; \cdot \left\lfloor \frac{n - 1}{2*10^{s}} \right\rfloor}}} \right\}.$

Since division operations are not properly defined in Paillier, we hold off on downscaling operations in the encrypted domain. A record of the change in scale is kept after each operation in the encrypted domain; this record is utilized to obtain {tilde over (r)} upon decryption of the result.

Homomorphic Matrix addition and Multiplication with Encrypted Matrices

All matrix operations described in this section require knowledge of only the Paillier public-key pair (g, n). Encrypted matrices and vectors are denoted [[M]]P(g,n), [[v]]^(P(g,n)) respectively, where each element of the matrix or vector is an element encrypted utilizing the Paillier public-key pair (g,n). Specifically, the decryption of any element [[M]]_(i,j) ^(P(g,n)) equals M_(i,j) i.e. M_(i,j)=PD([[M]]_(i,j) ^(P(g,n))). The operator “[+]” denotes homomorphic addition of matrices or vectors; whereas the operator “[X]” represents multiplication of matrices, where one of the two matrices are encrypted.

As will be appreciated by one skilled in the art, aspects of the present invention may be embodied as a system, method, or computer program product. Accordingly, aspects of the present invention may take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment (including firmware, resident software, micro-code, etc.), or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects that may all generally be referred to herein as a “service,” “circuit,” “circuitry,” “module,” and/or “system.” Furthermore, aspects of the present invention may take the form of a computer program product embodied in one or more computer readable medium(s) having computer readable program code embodied thereon.

Any combination of one or more computer readable medium(s) may be utilized. The computer readable medium may be a computer readable signal medium or a computer readable storage medium. A computer readable storage medium may be, for example, but not limited to, an electronic, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor system, apparatus, or device, or any suitable combination of the foregoing. More specific examples (a non-exhaustive list) of the computer readable storage medium would include the following: an electrical connection having one or more wires, a portable computer diskette, a hard disk, a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or Flash memory), an optical fiber, a portable compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM), an optical storage device, a magnetic storage device, or any suitable combination of the foregoing. In the context of this document, a computer readable storage medium may be any tangible medium that can contain, or store a program for use by or in connection with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device.

Program code and/or executable instructions embodied on a computer readable medium may be transmitted using any appropriate medium, including but not limited to wireless, wireline, optical fiber cable, radio frequency, etc., or any suitable combination of the foregoing.

Computer program code for carrying out operations for aspects of the present invention may be written in any combination of one or more programming languages, including an object oriented programming language such as Java, Smalltalk, C++ or the like and conventional procedural programming languages, such as the “C” programming language or similar programming languages. The program code may execute entirely on the user's computer (device), partly on the user's computer, as a stand-alone software package, partly on the user's computer and partly on a remote computer or entirely on the remote computer or server. In the latter scenario, the remote computer may be connected to the user's computer through any type of network, including a local area network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN), or the connection may be made to an external computer (for example, through the Internet using an Internet Service Provider).

Aspects of the present invention are described herein with reference to flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems) and computer program products according to embodiments of the invention. It will be understood that each block of the flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams, and combinations of blocks in the flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions may be provided to a processor of a general purpose computer, special purpose computer, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, create means for implementing the functions/acts specified in the flowchart and/or block diagram block or blocks.

These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer readable medium that can direct a computer, other programmable data processing apparatus, or other devices to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer readable medium produce an article of manufacture including instructions which implement the function/act specified in the flowchart and/or block diagram block or blocks.

The computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer, other programmable data processing apparatus, or other devices to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer, other programmable apparatus or other devices to produce a computer implemented process such that the instructions which execute on the computer or other programmable apparatus provide processes for implementing the functions/acts specified in the flowchart and/or block diagram block or blocks.

While the invention has been described with reference to certain embodiments, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that various changes may be made and equivalents may be substituted for elements thereof to adapt to particular situations without departing from the scope of the disclosure. Therefore, it is intended that the claims not be limited to the particular embodiments disclosed, but that the claims will include all embodiments falling within the scope and spirit of the appended claims. 

1. A method for comparing two sets of private data without revealing the data, the method comprising the steps of: computing, by a first party, a first private matrix (A₁) according to the equation A₁=d₁·d₁ ^(T) where d₁ is a first private data expressed as a column vector and d¹ ^(T) is its corresponding transpose; finding a first eigenvalue (λ_(d1)) and a corresponding unity normalized first eigenvector (V_(d1)) of the first private matrix (A₁); computing, by a second party, a second private matrix (A₂) according to the equation A₂=d₂·d₂ ^(T) where d₂ is a second private data expressed as a column vector and d₂ ^(T) is its corresponding transpose; finding a second eigenvalue (λ_(d2)) and a corresponding unity normalized second eigenvector (V_(d2)) of the second private matrix (A₂); computing a bisector vector (x) in the equation (d₁·d₁ ^(T)+d₂·d₂ ^(T))x=λ_(d1)V_(d1)+λ_(d2)V_(d2) without the first party or the second party revealing d₁, λ_(d1), V_(d1), d₂, λ_(d2) or V_(d2); determining whether or not (1) an angular deviation between the first eigenvector (V_(d1)) and the second eigenvector (V_(d2)) is within a threshold, or (2) a distance between V_(d1) and V_(d2) is within the threshold, wherein: if the threshold is satisfied, the first private data and second private data are deemed sufficiently similar; if the threshold is un satisfied, the first private data and second private data are deemed dissimilar.
 2. The method as recited in claim 1, further comprising the step of digitizing, by the first party, a personal biometric trait to produce the first private data.
 3. The method as recited in claim 1, wherein the angular deviation is given by 2*Arc Tan(e/V) where e=x−V, and V is either the first eigenvector V_(d1) or the second eigenvector V_(d2).
 4. A method for comparing two sets of private data without revealing those private data and reconstructing one of the private data sets, the method comprising the steps of: computing, by a first party, a first private matrix (A₁) according to the equation A₁=d₁·d₁ ^(T) where d₁ is a first private data expressed as a column vector and d₁ ^(T) is its corresponding transpose; finding a first eigenvalue (λ_(d1)) and a corresponding unity normalized first eigenvector (V_(d1)) of the first private matrix (A₁); computing, by a second party, a second private matrix (A₂) according to the equation A₂=d₂·d₂ ^(T) where d₂ is a second private data expressed as a column vector and d₂ ^(T) is its corresponding transpose; finding a second eigenvalue (λ_(d2)) and a corresponding unity normalized second eigenvector (V_(d2)) of the second private matrix (A₂); computing, jointly by the first party and second party, a bisector vector (x) in the equation (d₁·d₁ ^(T)+d₂·d₂ ^(T))x=λ_(d1)V_(d1)+λ_(d2)V_(d2) without the first party or the second party revealing d₁, λ_(d1), V_(d1), d₂, λ_(d2) or V_(d2); determining, by the second party, whether or not (1) an angular deviation or (2) a distance between V_(d1) and V_(d2) is within the threshold, wherein: if the threshold is satisfied, the first private data and second private data are deemed sufficiently similar; if the threshold is un satisfied, the first private data and second private data are deemed dissimilar; transmitting from the second party to the first party, if the threshold is satisfied, helper data that includes λ_(d2) plus a mathematical operator and permits the first party to reconstruct the second party's private data by combining the helper data with the first private data.
 5. The method as recited in claim 4, wherein the mathematical operator is dividing by d₂ ^(T)·x and the helper data is therefore λ_(d2)/d₂ ^(T)·x.
 6. The method as recited in claim 4, wherein the helper data comprises √{square root over (λ_(d2))}.
 7. The method as recited in claim 4, wherein the step of computing the bisector vector (x) comprises the first party performing the steps of: encrypting with a first Paillier key (k₁) and send E(A₁,k₁ and E(λ_(d1)V_(d1),k₁) to the second party—where E(A₁,k₁) is the encryption of A1 using Paillier public key k1; receiving from the second party a Paillier-encrypted E(A₂,k₂) and E(λ_(d2)V_(d2),k₂) where k₂ is a second Paillier key; computing E(P₁(A₁+A₂),k₂), where P₁ is a random first matrix; sending E(P₁(A₁+A₂),k₂) to the second party; computing E(Y,k₂)=E(λ_(d1)V_(d1)+λ_(d2)V_(d2))v^(t),k₂), where v^(t) is a random first vector; sending E(Y,k₂) to the second party; sending E((v^(t))⁻¹,k₁) to the second party, where (v^(t))⁻¹ is the Moore-Penrose Pseudoinverse of (v^(t)); receiving E(X₁,k₂)=E((P₁(A₁+A₂))⁻¹P₁(λ_(d1)V_(d1)+λ₂V_(d2)) v^(t),k₂) from the second party and compute an encrypted solution E(x,k₂) by multiplying E(X₁,k₂) homomorphically with (v^(t))⁻¹; sending the encrypted solution E(x,k₂) to the second party; receiving a second encrypted solution E(x,k₁) from the second party where the second party obtains E(x,k₁) by multiplying E((v^(t))⁻¹,k₁) homomorphically with P₁(A₁+A₂))⁻¹ P₁(λ_(d1)V_(d1)+λ₂V_(d2)) v^(t) to arrive at E(P₁(A₁+A₂))⁻¹ P₁(λ_(d1)V_(d1)+λ_(d2)V_(d2))v^(t)•(v^(t))⁻¹,k₁)=E(x,k₁). decrypting E(x,k₁) using the first Paillier key to obtain the bisector vector (x).
 8. The method as recited in claim 4, wherein the step of computing the bisector vector (x) comprises the second party performing the steps of: receiving from the first party E(A₁,k₁) and E(k_(d1)V_(d1),k₁), where k₁ is a first Paillier key; sending to the first party a Paillier-encrypted E(A₂,k₂) and E(X_(d2)V_(d2),k₂) where k₂ is a second Paillier key; receiving from the first party E(P₁(A₁+A₂),k₂), where P₁ is a random first matrix; decrypting E(P ₁+A₂),k₂) to P₁ (A ₁+A₂); computing R=(P₁(A₁+A₂))⁻¹ where R is the Moore-Penrose Pseudoinverse of P₁(A₁+A₂); receiving E(Y,k₂) from the first party and decrypting E(Y,k₂) to obtain Y, where Y=P₁(λ_(d2)V_(d2)+λ₂V_(d2)) v^(t) where v^(t) is a random first vector; receiving E((v^(t))⁻¹,k₁) from the first party, where (v^(t))⁻¹ is the Moore-Penrose Pseudoinverse of (v^(t)); computing E(x,k₁)=E(R*Y*(v^(t))⁻¹,k₁) receiving an encrypted solution E(x,k₂) from the first party and decrypt it using the second Paillier key to obtain the bisector vector (x); sending E(x,k₁) to the first party.
 9. The method as recited in claim 4, wherein the step of computing the bisector vector (x) comprises the first party performing the steps as recited in claim 7 and the second party performing the steps as recited in claim
 8. 10. The method as recited in claim 4, wherein the step of computing the bisector vector (x) using a Privacy-preserving cooperative scientific computation protocol.
 11. The method as recited in claim 4, wherein the first private data is a first biometric signature and the second private data is a second biometric signature.
 12. The method as recited in claim 4, wherein the first private data is a first fingerprint and the second private data is a second fingerprint.
 13. A program storage device readable by machine, tangibly embodying a program of instructions executable by machine to perform the method steps for comparing two sets of private data without revealing those private data and reconstructing one of the private data sets, the method comprising the steps of: computing, by a first party, a first private matrix (A₁) according to the equation A₁=d₁·d₁ ^(T) where d₁ is a first private data expressed as a column vector and d₁ ^(T) is its corresponding transpose; finding a first eigenvalue (λ_(d1)) and a corresponding unity normalized first eigenvector (V_(d1)) of the first private matrix (A₁); computing, by a second party, a second private matrix (A₂) according to the equation A₂=d₂·d₂ ^(T) where d₂ is a second private data expressed as a column vector and d₂ ^(T) is its corresponding transpose; finding a second eigenvalue (λ₁₂) and a corresponding unity normalized second eigenvector (V_(d2)) of the second private matrix (A₂); computing, jointly by the first party and second party, a bisector vector (x) in the equation (d₁·d₁ ^(T)+d₂·d₂ ^(T))x=λ_(d1)V_(d1)+λ_(d2)V_(d2) without the first party or the second party revealing d₁, λ_(d1), V_(al), d₂, λ_(d2) or V_(d2;) determining, by the second party, whether or not (1) an angular deviation or (2) a distance between V_(d1) and V_(d2) is within the threshold, wherein: if the threshold is satisfied, the first private data and second private data are deemed sufficiently similar; if the threshold is un satisfied, the first private data and second private data are deemed dissimilar; transmitting from the second party to the first party, if the threshold is satisfied, helper data that includes X,_(d2) plus a mathematical operator and permits the first party to reconstruct the second party's private data by combining the helper data with the first private data.
 14. The program storage device as recited in claim 13, wherein the mathematical operator is dividing by d₂ ^(T)·x and the helper data is therefore λ_(d2)/d₂ ^(T)·x.
 15. The program storage device as recited in claim 13, wherein the helper data comprises √{square root over (λ₂)}.
 16. The program storage device as recited in claim 13, wherein the step of computing the bisector vector (x) comprises the first party performing the steps of: encrypting with a first Paillier key (k₁) and send E(A₁,k₁) and E(λ_(d1)V_(d1),k₁) to the second party—where E(A₁,k₁) is the encryption of A1 using Paillier public key k1; receiving from the second party a Paillier-encrypted E(A₂,k₂) and E(λ_(c2)V_(d2),k₂) where k₂ is a second Paillier key; computing E(P₁(A₁+A₂),k₂), where P₁ is a random first matrix; sending E(P₁(A₁+A₂),k₂) to the second party; computing E(Y,k₂)=E(P₁(λ_(d1)V_(d1)+λ_(d2)V_(d2)) v^(t),k₂), where v^(t) is a random first vector; sending E(Y,k₂) to the second party; sending E((v^(t))⁻¹,k₁) to the second party, where (v^(t))⁻¹ is the Moore-Penrose Pseudoinverse of (v^(t)); receiving E(X₁,k₂)=E((P₁(A₁+A₂))⁻¹ P₁(λ_(d1)V_(d1)+λ_(d2)V_(d2)) v^(t),k₂) from the second party and compute an encrypted solution E(x,k₂) by multiplying E(X₁,k₂) homomorphically with (v^(t))⁻¹; sending the encrypted solution E(x,k₂) to the second party; receiving a second encrypted solution E(x,k₁) from the second party where the second party obtains E(x,k₁) by multiplying E((v^(t))⁻¹,k₁) homomorphically with P₁(A₁+A₂))⁻¹P₁(λ_(d1)V_(d1)+λ_(d2)V_(d2)) v^(t) to arrive at E(P₁(A₁+A₂))⁻¹ P₁(λ_(d1)V_(d1)+λ_(d2)V_(d2))v^(t)•(v^(t))⁻¹,k₁)=E(x,k₁). decrypting E(x,k₁) using the first Paillier key to obtain the bisector vector (x).
 17. The program storage device as recited in claim 13, wherein the step of computing the bisector vector (x) comprises the second party performing the steps of: receiving from the first party E(A₁,k₁) and E(λ_(d1)V_(d1),k₁), where k₁ is a first Paillier key; sending to the first party a Paillier-encrypted E(A₂,k₂) and E(λ_(d2)V_(d2),k₂) where k₂ is a second Paillier key; receiving from the first party E(P₁(A₁+A₂),k₂), where P₁ is a random first matrix; decrypting E(P₁(A₁+A₂),k₂) to P ₁(A₁+A₂); computing R=((1³ ₁(A₁+A₂)))⁻¹ where R is the Moore-Penrose Pseudoinverse of P₁(A₁+A₂); receiving E(Y,k₂) from the first party and decrypting E(Y,k₂) to obtain Y, where Y=P₁(λ_(d2)V_(d2)+λ_(d2)V_(d2))v^(t) where v^(t) is a random first vector; receiving E((v^(t))⁻¹,k₁) from the first party, where (v^(t))⁻¹ is the Moore-Penrose Pseudoinverse of (v^(t)); computing E(x,k₁)=E(R*Y*(v^(t))⁻¹,k₁) receiving an encrypted solution E(x,k₂) from the first party and decrypt it using the second Paillier key to obtain the bisector vector (x); sending E(x,k₁) to the first party. 